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The Equitable Subordination
of Claims in Bankruptcy
Asa S. Herzog* and Joel B. Zweibel**
The authors of this article address themselves to the problems raised
by the use by bankruptcy courts of their equity powers to subordinate
claims. They discuss the distinctions between subordination and dis-
allowance, the interplay between state and federal law, res adjudicata,
and the classes of cases in which equitable subordination occurs. They
conclude that, while much confusion exists in this area, the equitable
principles involved are generally sound and that applying them is
often in the best interest of debtor, creditor, and public.
I. JUmSDICrION
Equality of distribution is the theme of the Bankruptcy Act.1 Section
65a2 provides that "dividends of an equal per centum shall be declared and
paid on all claims except such as have priority." Except for section 64a3
which sets up certain classes of debts having priority in advance of pay-
ment of dividends to creditors, there is nothing in the act which specifically
authorizes departure from the principle of equality declared by section
65a. Subordination of one or more claims or of one or more classes of
claims, therefore, is not ordinarily a statutory function of the bankruptcy
court in administering bankrupt estates. 4 Yet, it is obvious that certain
claims possess an intrinsic ethical superiority to others; this ethical su-
periority presents a compelling reason for overriding the principle of equal-
ity declared by section 65a.
Since the power of a court of equity to superintend the administration of
justice is universally recognized, the bankruptcy courts simply drew upon
their powers as courts of equity to correct the abuses, fraud and inequity
which would otherwise flow from a strict and unswerving application of
the equal distribution principle of section 65a. Furthermore, the Bank-
ruptcy Act directly confers equitable jurisdiction upon the bankruptcy
courts. Section 2a invests the courts of bankruptcy with "such jurisdiction
at law and equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in
0 Referee in Bankruptcy, Southern District of New York.
** L.L.B., Yale; member of the New York Bar.
1. Sampsell v. Imperial Paper Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941); Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S.
4 (1931).
2. 30 Stat. 563 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 105a (1958).
3. 30 Stat. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104a (1958).
4. Geist v. Prudence Realization Corp., 122 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1941), reo'd on other
grounds, 316 U.S. 89 (1942).
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proceedings under this Act .. . .,' Consequently the courts have held that
for many purposes courts of bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity and
their proceedings inherently proceedings in equity;6 in exercising the juris-
diction conferred upon them, they apply the principles and rules of equity
jurisprudence.7
These equitable powers have been exercised in passing on a wide range
of problems arising out of the administration of bankrupt estates to the
end that fraud will not prevail, that substance will not give way to form
and that technical considerations will not prevent substantial justice from
being done.8 Thus, without direct authority in the act, the courts have
enjoined a creditor, after adjudication and discharge, from prosecuting a
claim in the state courts;9 have protected an estate against fraudulent
assessment;' 0 have compelled execution of a deed to make bankrupt's
equitable title a complete legal title;" have recovered dividends paid
pursuant to an order later reversed;' 2 and have permitted claims to be
proved after expiration of the six months period in order to prevent
injustice.13
In the field of claims, equitable powers are even more directly conferred.
Section 2a(2) empowers the courts to allow and disallow claims and to
reconsider claims allowed or disallowed, and section 57k14 provides that
"claims which have been allowed, may be reconsidered for cause and
reallowed or rejected in whole or in part according to the equities of the
case .... " Thus "equity" twice crops up in connection with claims: the
court is invested with jurisdiction in equity to allow, disallow and reconsider
claims (section 2a(2)) and upon reconsideration may reject allowed claims
according to the equities of the case (section 57k). And, if a claim pre-
viously allowed may later be rejected in whole or part according to the
equities of the case, then logic dictates that disallowance or subordination
in the light of equitable considerations may originally be made.15
5. 30 Stat. 545 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § lla (1958). (Emphasis added.)
6. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934). As early as 1900, immediately
after enactment of the present Bankruptcy Act, the Supreme Court, in Bardes v.
Hawarden Bank, 178 U.S. 524 (1900), held that the proceedings in bankruptcy are
generally in the nature of proceedings in equity. Accord, In 7,e Rockford, 124 Fed. 182
(8th Cir. 1903); In re Siegel-HiUman Dry Goods Co., 111 Fed. 980 (D.C. Mo. 1901).
7. Larson v. First State Bank, 21 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1927); Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295 (1939).
8. Pepper v. Litton, supra note 7.
9. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
10. Cross v. Georgia Iron & Coal Co., 250 Fed. 438 (5th Cir. 1918).
11. Dearborn Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Jones, 299 Fed. 432 (8th Cir. 1924).
12. In re Lilyknit Silk Underwear Co., 73 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1934).
13. Burton Coal Co. v. Franklin Coal Co., 67 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1933); Williams
v. Rice, 30 F.2d 814 (5th Cir. 1929); Larson v. First Nat'l Bank, 21 F.2d 936 (8th
Cir. 1927).
14. 30 Stat. 560 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 93K (1958). (Emphasis added.)
15. Pepper v. Litton, supra note 7. A few isolated cases have looked to § 2a(7) of
the act, Searle v. Mechanics Loan & Trust Co., 249 Fed. 942 (9th Cir. 1918); or have
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Hence, equality of distribution is not an "inexorable rule"' 6 and while
specifically empowered to inquire into the validity of any claim asserted
against the estate and to disallow it if it be without lawful existence,17 or
fictitious or sham,' 8 the power of the court is not narrowly limited to the
bare legal question of validity.19 The test is not the existence or non-
existence of the debt;20 rather, the courts will be guided by cardinal
principles of equity jurisprudence to the end that injustice or unfairness is
not done in the administration of the bankrupt estate. The Supreme Court
has unequivocally stated that the power of the bankruptcy coufts to subordi-
nate claims or to adjudicate equities arising out of the relationship between
creditors is complete.2 '
However, it is well settled that the equitable power of the court to
subordinate claims does not extend to any of the priority classes provided
for in section 64; the court may not set up sub-classifications within a class
in which there is no priority and fix an order of priority for the sub-classes
on some equitable basis. The reason is that the court may not, by granting
a priority which it deems equitable, set aside the clear congressional
mandate that there is to be no priority among the priorities. 22
II. SUBORDINATON OR DIsALtowAjcE?
Before launching into a discussion of the nature, cause and effect of
equitable subordination, some mention should be made of the distinction
between outright disallowance of a claim and the subordination thereof
to the claims of others. There seems to be an inadvertent confusion of the
concepts of disallowance of a claim and postponement or subordination of it.
This has resulted in frequent obiter dicta that mere reasons of equity may
require a creditor's claim to be either totally disregarded or subordinated.23
On other occasions courts, aware of the differentiation, have nevertheless
held the question to be academic, saying since there is small chance of the
other unsecured creditors receiving more than a small percentage of their
claims, postponement instead of disallowance would be of no benefit to the
referred to the doctrines of estoppel, Bird & Sons Sales Corp. v. Tobin, 78 F.2d 371
(8th Cir. 1935), equitable lien, Searle v. Mechanics Loan & Trust Co., supra, or
constructive trust, In re Dodge-Freedman Poultry Co., 148 F. Supp. 647 (D.N.H.
1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 314. The leading decisions, however, find their support in the
inherent equity powers of the bankruptcy court and in § 2a(2) and § 57k of the act.
16. Bird & Sons Sales Corp. v. Tobin, 78 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1935).
17. Lesser v. Gray, 236 U.S. 70 (1915).
18. In re Hicks & Son, Inc., 82 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1936).
19. Bird & Sons Sales Corp. v. Tobin, 78 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1935).
20. Pepper v. Litton, supra note 7.
21. Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1931).
22. Luther v. United States, 225 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1955); In the Matter of
Columbia Ribbon Co., 117 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. 1941).
23. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
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claimant.2 From a practical point of view such approach may be quite
reasonable, but it could result in grave injustice, if, for instance, additional
assets are recovered to the estate sufficient to pay general creditors in full
with a surplus over.
Disallowance of a claim negates its validity and existence and completely
ousts the claimant from creditor status for all purposes. A claim should be
rejected and disallowed, it seems to us, when it has no basis in fact or law,
is non-existent or illegal. Equitable jurisdiction should not be exercised
when there is a full, adequate and complete remedy at law. Subordination
should be ordered when the claimant is undeniably a creditor, but for
reasons of equity2 5 should be relegated to a rank inferior to that of general
creditors.2 6
The jurisdiction to disallow claims on legal grounds is derived directly
from the act.27 Only in subordinating or postponing claims does the court
exercise its inherent equitable powers. In all these cases the court proclaims
itself a court of equity with the power to do equity-but relief in equity is
remedial and not penal.2 8 Disallowance of a valid legal claim because of
misconduct obnoxious to a court of equity is certainly penal in nature. If
under the cardinal principles of equity a creditor is not entitled to share
ratably with other creditors, then it seems clear that the proper remedial
relief is postponement of payment to him until all others have been paid
in fu]l.29
We think that one fairly accurate test is the direction of claimant's
harmful conduct: if directed at the bankrupt, then the claim should be dis-
allowed either on the purely legal ground that the claim is invalid or
because a valid defense exists;30 if directed at the creditors, or at both the
bankrupt and creditors, to perpetrate a fraud on them, or to obtain an
unfair advantage over them, then although the claim may be a valid one
as against the bankrupt, the remedy is properly subordination.
3 '
24. McDonell v. Sampsell, 193 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1952) (subordination equated
with disallowance); Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp. v. United States, 151 F.2d 461, 470
(6th Cir. 1945); Goldie v. Cox, 130 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1942).
25. See discussion under heading "Classification of Subordination Cases," infra.
26. Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1955).
27. Sections 2a(2) and 57k.
28. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 435 (1945).
29. Collier points out that the equities may in "extreme" eases be strong enough to
warrant disallowance absolutely and entirely, but that in the cases characterized as
"extreme" the disallowance negatives the very validity of the claim. 3 CoLLIER, BANK-
IUPTcy 214 (14th ed. 1956). This would seem to mean that in such cases the con-
duct of the claimant was such as to give rise to a legal defense.
30. Of course, a transaction may be declared void or voidable by statute regardless
of the direction of the misconduct. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act § 60b, 30 Stat. 562
(1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96b (1958); § 67d, 30 Stat. 564 (1898), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107d (1958).
31. Goldie v. Cox, 130 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1942). It is true that where equity
pierces the corporate veil in the alter ego situations, the stockholder's claim may be
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Besides the improbable, but not impossible, situation where a surplus may
remain after payment to creditors in full, there are, it seems to us, other
cogent reasons why the distinction should be observed, and why claims
which ought to be subordinated should not be penalized with disallowance.
For instance, the question of insolvency may well become an issue in suits
to avoid preferences,3 2 or liens obtained by attachment, judgment, levy,
etc.,33 or fraudulent transfers,34 where the inclusion or exclusion of
the subordinated claim as a debt could spell the difference between
solvency and insolvency. A creditor whose claim is subordinated does not
cease to be a creditor,3 5 and a subordinated debt does not reduce the overall
indebtedness of the bankrupt; it remains a liability to be counted in
determining whether the bankrupt is or was insolvent.36 Furthermore, there
appears no valid reason why a subordinated claim cannot be voted. Sub-
ordination, as we have said, does not destroy the claimant's status as a
creditor. The right of the creditor to have his claim allowed is in no wise
dependent upon the order of payment as between the various creditors, 37
and subordination simply adjusts equities among the creditors and regulates
distribution.38 Section 1(11)3 9 of the act defines a "creditor" to include
anyone who owns a debt, demand or claim provable in bankruptcy, and
section 56a states that "creditors" shall pass upon matters submitted to them
at their meetings. Thus it would seem clear that a creditor, whose claim
has been subordinated, is not thereby disfranchised or otherwise deprived
of his creditor rights except to share pari passu with the other creditors.40
If the distinction we make between disallowance and subordination is
valid and if claims which ought to be merely subordinated should not be
properly disallowed, but this is simply because the stockholder and the bankrupt
corporation are deemed one, and of course a bankrupt cannot at the same time be its
own creditor.
32. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(1), 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96a(1)
(1958).
33. Bankruptcy Act § 67a(1), 30 Stat. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107a(1)
(1958).
34. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2), 30 Stat. 564 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107d(2)
(1958).
35. Goldstein v. Wolfson, 132 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1943).
36. In re Ultimite Corp., 207 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1953).
37. McKey v. Brims, 243 Fed. 370 (7th Cir. 1917).
38. In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co., 144 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1944).
39. 30 Stat. 560 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 92a (1958).
40. The implication of Schwartz v. Mills, 192 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1951), is that
if the corporation creditor were subordinated for equitable reasons, it would not be
permitted to vote for a trustee. But this on the ground that if the corporate veil
were pierced, claimant would fall within the disfranchising provisions of Bankruptcy
Act § 44a, 30 Stat. 557 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 72a (1958). But see In re
Itemlab, Inc., CCH Bankr. L. Rep. ff 60232 (E.D.N.Y. 1961), where a creditor who
obtained a subordination agreement from another creditor was held entitled to vote the
claim of the subordinated debt for acceptance of an arrangement. The subordinated
debt, said the court, was held as security for a loan, gave the holder complete control
over the claim and created an equitable lien in tis favor.
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disallowed, then the legal form subordination should take seems obvious
enough. Several methods suggest themselves but the one most logical seems
to be to allow the claim and to provide in the order of allowance for
postponing participation in distribution until all other general creditors
have been paid in full.41
III. FEDmiAL OR STATE LAw
Section 6342 of the act prescribes what debts are provable, and while
provability and allowability are essentially a federal question, a debt exists
or does not exist by force of state law.43 If there was no valid claim under
local law before bankruptcy, there is no claim for a bankruptcy court to
recognize or reject." Nevertheless, it is well established that federal law
and not state law is determinative of the relative priority of claims asserted
against a bankrupt estate.45 This problem arose in Prudence v. Geist.46
There the Second Circuit, by a divided court, followed the New York rule
that a guarantor of mortgage certificates who also has an interest in the
mortgage cannot share in the collateral until certificate holders have been
paid in full unless there is a clear reservation in the certificate to the
contrary. The majority saw the New York rule as one of contract construc-
tion, while Judge Frank, dissenting, saw it as an equitable rule of
administration in the distribution of the assets of an insolvent guarantor.
The Supreme Court, agreeing with Judge Frank, held that the Bankruptcy
Act prescribes its own criteria for distribution and federal, not local, law
will be applied in determining the extent to which the inequitable conduct
of a claimant in acquiring or asserting his claim in bankruptcy requires its
subordination to other claims.
While a debt founded upon a state court judgment is a provable claim
under section 63a(1) of the act, the judgment does not necessarily foreclose
the bankruptcy court from subordinating it to the claims of other creditors.
Whether the bankruptcy court will look behind the judgment and determine
whether the claim asserted is without lawful existence is quite another
question which we need not consider here at length. Pepper v. Litton4 7
41. Boyum v. Johnson, 127 F.2d 491 (8th Cir. 1942). Collier suggests four
alternate methods of treating the claim and comes to the conclusion that a simultaneous
allowance and qualification thereof is to be preferred. 3 CoLam, BANMUPTC 215-16
(14th ed. 1956).
42. 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1958).
43. In re Falk, 83 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); In re Calton Crescent, Inc., 80
F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Vanston Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 167 (1946)
(concurring opinion).
44. Vanston Comm. v. Green, supra note 43.
45. Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 732 (1946); In re Bell Tone Records, 86
F. Supp. 806 (D.N.J. 1949).
46. 316 U.S. 89 (1941), reversing 122 F.2d 503 (1941).
47. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
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plainly says that the bankruptcy court has precisely that power. But Heiser
v. Woodruff48 seemingly rejects Pepper in this respect and holds that the
bankruptcy court may not re-examine the issues determined by the judg-
ment itself. Be this as it may, the decisions are in accord that merger of
the claim into the judgment does not prevent the bankruptcy court from
subordinating a claim. The question of subordination turns not on the
existence or non-existence of the debt, but involves simply the order of
payment as affected by the violation of recognized principles of equity.49
Once it is recognized that the bankruptcy court has the paramount power
to subordinate a valid debt on equitable principles, it follows that a judg-
ment may not be interposed as a roadblock to an inquiry into whether or
not equitable grounds to subordinate exist.
IV. REs JuDICATA
In this connection the doctrine of res judicata is frequently raised. But
since the misconduct which moves the bankruptcy court to subordinate does
not turn on the existence or non-existence of the debt, such misconduct is
seldom involved in the previous litigation. Thus in Pepper the court held
that as the judgment creditor was also a controlling stockholder, he was a
fiduciary for the other creditors of the corporation and, as such, could not
prove his claim in competition with other creditors.50 Nor is the judgment
res judicata on the question of fraud or collusion in the procurement
thereof.51 And this is especially true as to judgments obtained by default or
pro confesso since the danger of fraud in such judgments is far greater than
in adversary proceedings. 52 Where a party has been prevented by fraud
from raising a valid defense, the bankruptcy court may go behind the
judgment and determine the validity of the debt.58 And as a corollary, the
court may find that although the defense is legally insufficient to defeat the
claim, yet it constitutes conduct which at least requires subordination of
the claim to the end that fraud will not prevail.
Of course, where the trustee in bankruptcy has already litigated an issue
in the state courts, the salutary doctrine of res judicata will prevai 5
48. 327 U.S. 726 (1946). It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Douglas, who
wrote the Pepper decision, dissented in Heiser (Mr. Justice Black concurring), and
adopted the opinion of the court below (150 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1945)); there,
following Pepper, it was held that the court could go behind the judgment and de-
cide for itself the questions previously litigated and tried, including the merits of the
cause of action.
49. Heiser v. Woodruff, supra note 48; Pepper v. Litton, supra note 47.
50. Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 738 (1946).
51. Heiser v. Woodruff, supra note 50; Margolis v. Nazareth Fair Grounds & Farmers
Mkt.,.249 F.2d 221 (2d Cir. 1957).
52. Margolis v. Nazareth Fair Grounds & Farmers Mkt., supra note 51.
53. Ibid.
54. Cf. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
55. Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726 (1946).
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Thus, where the same defense of fraud had been twice litigated unsuccess-
fully by the bankrupt and his trustee in the same court where the judgment
had been rendered, the fraud allegation could not be raised again in the
bankruptcy court.56 But where the trustee moved in the state court to set
aside the judgment on the technical ground that it had not been confessed
in the manner required by state statute, he was not barred from collaterally
attacking the judgment in the bankruptcy court.5 7 Furthermore, denial of
the trustees motion in the state court to set aside the judgment will not
be deemed res judicata where his motion was denied without inquiring
into the merits of his contention.5
V. CLASSIF cATION OF SUBOBDINrATION CASES
The situations involving subordination generally assume certain definite
recurring patterns which make it possible to arrive at a fairly distinct classi-
fication. The cases will ordinarily fall into one or more of the following
broad categories which will be discussed ad seriatim: First, consensual
subordination, express or implied; second, the so-called "capital contribu-
tion" cases wherein purported loans to the bankrupt by stockholders, part-
ners or joint-venturers are translated into capital contribution or other
proprietary interest; third, cases where fraud by the claimant in one or
more of its many facets requires subordination; fourth, illegality in the
origin or enforcement of the claim; and fifth, the broad "equitable consid-
erations" cases where claimant's relationship to the bankrupt either as
dominant parent, controlling stockholder or other fiduciary position requires
certain standards of conduct, in the absence of which subordination of the
claim will result.
A. Consensual Subordination
Voluntary agreements to subordinate or postpone claims which become
litigable in a bankruptcy forum are generally encountered in certain repeti-
tive contexts.
It is not uncommon for creditors of a debtor in financial straits to agree
to subordinate their claims to that of a prospective lender, in the hope that
the debtor may be rehabilitated by the infusion of additional funds. The
agreement commonly provides that in the event of liquidation of the
debtor's assets, the lender will be paid first. In this manner the lender is
compensated for the risk he assumes in advancing funds where more
cautious money fears to tread.
Often the officers or stockholders of the debtor promise to forego the
collection of any claims they have against the corporation until existing and
56. Ibid.
57. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
58. In re James A. Brady Foundry Co., 3 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1924).
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future creditors are paid, in consideration for an extension of the time of
payment of the latters' claims.
However, not all agreements to subordinate arise out of pecuniary dis-
tress. Agreements to subordinate are sometimes built into the capital
structure of a business entity, for example, where negotiable debentures are
expressly subordinate in payment to other classes of claims.5 9
Agreements to subordinate are uniformly enforceable and the particular
chapter of the Bankruptcy Act in which the agreement is invoked will not
affect its enforcement.60 The terms of such agreements vary with the intent
of the parties. Thus, the agreements may subordinate in favor of a specific
creditor or group of creditors,61 or may elevate the status of all other
creditors.62 "New money" may take priority in payment 63 or it may be
subordinate to the payment of other claims.64
The cases involving express agreements to subordinate present little
difficulty. More provocative are the cases in which the precise language of
the agreement does not call for subordination, but where from the nature
of the promise made, interpreted in the light of accompanying facts and
circumstances, an intent to subordinate may be inferred. For example,
where money was advanced by the president of a corporation to "guarantee"
the first payment under a composition agreement with the corporation's
creditors, the court held that it was intended that the president's claim be
subordinated to the claims of settlement creditors, though not subordinate
to those of subsequent creditors.65
Subordination by implication was also invoked where a debtor and certain
of its creditors agreed that the business be placed in the hands of a trustee
and that the debtor provide sufficient funds to pay the expenses of the
trustee and any new liabilities incurred in the operation of the business, and
59. In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 53 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd sub
nom. Elias v. Clarke, 143 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 778 (1944); In re
Aktiebolaget Krueger & Toll, 96 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1938); St. Louis Union Trust Co.
v. Champion Shoe Mach. Co., 109 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1913).
60. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Champion Shoe Mach. Co., supra note 59 (cor-
porate reorganization); In re Dodge-Freedman Poultry Co., 148 F. Supp. 647
(D.C.N.M. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 314 (1959) (chapter XI proceeding).
61. Bird & Sons Sales Corp. v. Tobin, 78 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1935) (subordination to,
all future indebtedness); In re Dodge-Freedman Poultry Co., supra note 60 (one
creditor subordinates to another); In re Handy-Andy Community Stores, Inc., 2
F. Supp. 97 (W.D. La. 1932) (all creditors subordinate to bank).
62. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Erickson, 117 F.2d 796 (9th Cir.
1941) (officers of debtor subordinate to all indebtedness, present and prospective).
63. Johns v. United Bank & Trust Co., 15 F.2d 300 (9th Cir. 1926); Searle v.
Mechanics' Loan & Trust Co., 249 Fed. 942 (9th Cir. 1918).
64. In re George C. Bruns Co., 256 Fed. 840 (7th Cir. 1919).
65. In re George C. Bruns Co., supra note 64. See also Prudence Realization Corp.
v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89 (1942), where federal equity law was held to require the sub-
ordination of a solvent surety of an insolvent's obligation to the creditors whose claims
the surety had undertaken to assure.
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the creditors signing the agreement agreed not to press their claims while
the agreement was in effect. In a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding it was
held that the creditors' promise to refrain from proceeding on their respec-
tive debts was a plain expression of intent to subordinate to the claims of
subsequent creditors. 66
However, due to the serious consequences of an order of subordination,67
the courts should be chary of finding a subordination by implication where
the proof is not clear and convincing that the parties, by their words and
conduct, intended to effect a consensual subordination.
Although it is sometimes startling to find that one not a party to an
agreement to subordinate may secure the benefits of the agreement, some
courts have reached just such a result without further elucidation.6 8 In
keeping with the general contractual framework, these holdings might be
sustained on a third-party beneficiary doctrine or on the rationale of a
continuing offer to subordinate being accepted by prospective creditors as
they extend credit. We think, however, that only where subsequent
creditors rely on a subordination agreement should a court of equity employ
the principle of estoppel to subordinate.69
The doctrine of estoppel plays an important role in this area. In one
case,70 an agreement to subordinate to a new lender was to become effective
only upon execution by ninety per cent of creditors in amount. The doctrine
was invoked to estop creditors from complaining of lack of due execution of
the agreement where they had permitted the lender to advance funds under
the agreement knowing that such action was based on the mistaken assump-
tion that the requisite ninety per cent had been secured.
In another case,7 ' a principal stockholder of a debtor was estopped by
the spirit of his subordination agreement from waiving his claim in the
debtor's chapter XI proceeding and thereby preventing the other party to
66. In re Geo. P. Schinzel & Son, Inc., 16 F.2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
67. See discussion under heading "Subordination or Disallowance," supra.
68. Bank of America Nat1 Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Erickson, 117 F.2d 796 (9th Cir.
1941); In re Geo. P. Schinzel & Son, Inc., 116 F.2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1926). In re Salem
Co-op. Window Glass Co., 40 F.2d 298 (D. Wyo. 1930) arrived at the unique result that
stockholders who were parties to a decision to have the corporation deduct on its books
$300 of the amount which should be earned as wages by each of the stockholders (the
corporation being a co-operative glass manufacturing concern) were not bound as
between themselves to refrain from asserting their $300 claims against the corporate
estate; but, though dictum, it was said that such an agreement would be binding as
to bona fide general creditors of the corporation though they were not parties to the
agreement. No reasons were given to support the dictum, although the situation
seemed to warrant the use of estoppel theory.
69. Bird & Sons Sales Corp. v. Tobin, 78 F.2d 371, 373 (8th Cir. 1935) pointed in
that direction by emphasizing that subsequent creditors relying upon subordination
were preferred.
70. Searle v. Mechanics' Loan & Trust Co., 249 Fed. 942 (9th Cir. 1918). See
also Litzke v. Gregory, 1 F.2d 112, 114 (8th Cir. 1924).
71. In the Matter of Dodge-Freedman Poultry Co., 148 F. Supp. 647 (D.N.H. 1956).
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the agreement from obtaining the benefits of the subordination agreement.
An agreement to subordinate having been found, the question has arisen
as to whether the bankruptcy court can postpone payment of dividends
merely upon the basis of the promise to subordinate, or whether there must
exist, in addition, a specific assignment of the claim or dividends to be
subordinated. One early case 72 held that a signed covenant that a certain
bank be paid in full before the claimant should receive anything on its
account was not an assignment of the claim or dividends to accrue thereon
and that in the absence of a specific order or transfer of a portion of the
fund, subordination could not be granted.
This excessively formalistic view should be distasteful to a court of equity.
In fact, recent cases have not made such demands. Indeed, it has been held
that, although an agreement to subordinate does not convey a present title
to the claim subordinated, a court of equity can enforce an agreement to
subordinate when the necessary conditions arise.
73
It has been held that a statutory priority may be relinquished by express
agreement.74 Such a view is questionable, however, in the light of the line
of authority that the doctrine of equitable subordination is inapplicable to
the statutory priorities.
75
In any event, the principles surrounding agreements to subordinate are
sufficiently settled to alert creditor interests to exactions which are within
their grasp before a debtor plummets into bankruptcy. The only caveat
would be that the agreement should be quite specific and show clearly
that the purpose is to subordinate certain specified claims to other partic-
ularized claims in the event of the occurrence of certain conditions includ-
ing any proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act.
B. Debt or Proprietary Interest: The Capital Contribution Cases
The so-called "capital contribution" cases have invariably been treated as
a sub-classification within the general sphere of equitable subordination of
claims. In these cases an alleged debt is transformed by the bankruptcy
court into what it deems to be the essential nature of the transaction, to wit,
a capital contribution or other proprietary interest.
Several courts relying on Pepper v. Litton76 have failed to see that these
cases actually turn upon the existence or non-existence of a debt, and not
upon the question of whether the court will subordinate the claim.
7
72. In the Matter of Goodman-Kinstler Cigar Co., 32 Am. Bankr. R. 624 (S.D. Calif.
1914).
73. In re Handy-Andy Community Stores, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 97 (W.D. La. 1932).
74. In re Caledonia Coal Co., 254 Fed. 742, 746 (E.D. Mich. 1918).
75. In re Aktiebolaget Kreuger & Toll, 96 F.2d 768, 770 (2d Cir. 1938). That is
not to say that a priority creditor cannot assign his claim.
76. 308 U.S. 295, 310 (1939).
77. Goldie v. Cox, 130 F.2d 695, 709 (8th Cir. 1942) (view of dissent); Boyum v.
Johnson, 127 F.2d 491, 494 (8th Cir. 1942).
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Actually, however, our perspective will be sharpened if we focus upon the
sole question involved here, that is, whether the claim is, as a matter of
substantial economic and legal reality, an indebtedness or whether it is a
proprietary interest.78 Once the judicial investigation has determined that
the claim is not in fact a debt but is a proprietary interest, subordination
follows as a matter of course for the essential nature of a capital interest is a
fund contributed to meet the obligations of a business and which is to be
repaid only after all other obligations have been satisfied9
Inasmuch as the focal issue is the true nature of the transaction, in order
to effect subordination it is not necessary to prove the existence of fraud or
other inequitable conduct.8 ° Nevertheless, where the advance of capital
funds is deliberately cloaked as a formal debt, it is indeed a common bed-
fellow with subordinating influences such as fraud, illegality or other
variants of misconduct.81
Undercapitalization is an important factor contributing to the insolvency
of business corporations. When bankruptcy ensues, it is not atypical to
find the dominant stockholders appearing with proofs of claim in hand for
advances made by them to the corporation. Although the judicial determi-
nation of a loan or proprietary interest will depend upon the unique facts
of each case, certain general principles can be abstracted from the cases.
The appropriate standards to be employed in determining whether advances
are in reality contributions to capital, and therefore not bona fide debts on
the part of the business, have been stated more distinctly in tax cases.
Although the purpose of the inquiry in such cases82 differs from the
purpose of the inquiry in bankruptcy, the basic question is still one of
capital or loan, and the applicable standards should not differ measurably.
The tax courts have said that what counts is the substance of the advance.
If the funds have been advanced with reasonable expectations of repayment,
they are loans; if as a matter of substantial economic reality they are risked
upon the success of the venture, the funds are actually capital.83 The
factors relevant to the determination of capital or loan include: the original
78. Several courts have properly sighted upon the basic question of loan or proprietary
interest, e.g., International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Holton, 247 F.2d 178, 182 (4th Cir.
1957); Goldstein v. Wolfson, 132 F.2d 624, 626 (2d Cir. 1943) (subordination results
from a showing that the claim is not in fact based upon a loan).
79. In re Desnoyers Shoe Co., 210 Fed. 533 (S.D. Ill.), aff'd, 224 Fed. 372, 377
(1915).
80. Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 1958).
81. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939) (the Deep Rock
doctrine); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Holton, supra note 78; Costello v. Fazio,
supra note 80.
82. The problem before the tax court is to determine (1) whether returns upon
advances to a corporation are deductible as interest on loans, or are dividends and
therefore non-deductible in the computation of net income; and (2) whether, upon
the failure of a business, advances to it will be fully deductible as bad debti or only
partially deductible as a capital loss.
83. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957).
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debt-equity ratio,84 the lack of reasonable expectation of repayment,
whether outside investors would make such advances, and the motives
determining the form of the advance.8 5
Unfortunately, some bankruptcy courts86 have utilized the vague criterion
of Pepper v. Litton (i.e., the "rules of fair play and good conscience) 87
to determine the narrow question of whether the advance is in fact loan or
proprietary interest. A few opinions, however, have attempted to sketch
applicable principles. Thus, it has been said that it is not sufficient to
find that the capitalization was inadequate, but that it must have been
"purely nominal."88 We believe that this test is too restrictive and that
the court should make a factual determination as to whether the corporation
has been provided with separate assets adequate to give it at least a reason-
able business chance to carry out its asserted functions8 9 There is, of
course, no requirement in law or equity that stockholders must initially
provide for unforeseen losses not ordinarily contemplated in the particular
business.9" Capital in this context refers not to working capital, but to
the amount of the stockholder's investment, the paid-in capital.91
On occasion the undercapitalization has been bold and immediately
apparent. For example, in one case92 where a partnership was incorporated,
two partners who became the officers, directors and controlling stockholders
of the corporation converted their partnership capital contributions of
$56,620 into loans, leaving the successor corporation with a gross under-
capitalization of $6,000, the court construed the purported loan to be
in fact capital contributions. In another case,93 the bankrupt was or-
ganized with an entirely inadequate capital of $1,500; the corporate pred-
ecessor had substituted for capital stock an indebtedness to itself of
$565,000, thus rendering the bankrupt insolvent, in the bankruptcy sense,
from its birth. An extensive inquiry into the amount of capital necessary to
84. See Isidor Dobkin, 15 T.C. 31 (1950) where the ratio of debt to capital stock
investment was 35 to 1; in conjunction with other factors, the advance was deemed
capital.
85. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957).
86. Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 1958); Goldie v. Cox, 130 F.2d
695, 709 (8th Cir. 1942) (view of dissent).
87. Discussed under heading "The Instrumentality and Alter Ego Cases," supra.
88. Brown v. Freedman, 125 F.2d 151, 156 (1st Cir. 1942).
89. In the Matter of Lumber Inc., 124 F. Supp. 302, 308 (D. Ore. 1954).
90. Id. at 307.
91. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 310 (1939); Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903,
909 (9th Cir. 1958).
92. Costello v. Fazio, supra note 91. See also Boyum v. Johnson, 127 F.2d 491
(8th Cir. 1942), where due to the amounts, duration and need for cash advances, it
was held that the sole stockholder had embarked on a course of permanent financing.
93. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Holton, 247 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1957). There
are, of course, cases in which the determination is exceedingly close and where the
referee's findings of fact, after hearing the witnesses, takes on added significance. In re
Madelaine, Inc., 164 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1947).
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generate a reasonable volume of business may not be necessary where
the facts indicate that for no apparent reason ostensible loans were not
repaid, no interest was paid, and the loans were not intended to be repaid
in the ordinary course of business.94
A good indication of the essential nature of an advance, although cir-
cumstantial, is the cause of the eventual insolvency. If the financial diff-
culties which occasion the 'loans" result from the initial insufficiency of
capital, the loans are more susceptible to being regarded as contributions to
capital.9 5 On the other hand, if bankruptcy is attributable to causes other
than that the entire life of the company from its inception was an insolvent
operation, the loan is more likely to be sustained as such.96
No distinction should be made between contributions of money and
contributions of property.97 Property may be leased or loaned or it may
be part of the original capitalization, and identical principles should apply
in ascertaining the essential economic nature of the property transfer.
Another factor is time. The longer a corporation functions on its initial
capital before controlling stockholders make advances, the greater the
likelihood that the advances will be held bona fide loans.98
The situation of partners presenting a claim against their partnership is
comparable to that of stockholders claiming against their corporation.99
No claim may be proved for what was meant to be a capital contribution.1 00
Where, however, the advance represents an ordinary and bona fide debt,
there is no reason why a partner should be precluded by his mere capacity
as a partner from sharing in the assets according to the criteria established
by section 5 of the Bankruptcy Act.10
Although restricted in number, the so-called "joint-venture" cases are,
94. L. & M. Realty Corp. v. Leo, 249 F.2d 668 (4th Cir. 1957).
95. SEC v. Liberty Baking Corp., 240 F.2d 511, 514 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 930 (1957).
96. In re L. M. Alleman Hardware Co., 181 Fed. 810, 813 (3d Cir. 1910); In the
Matter of Lumber Inc., 124 F. Supp. 302, 306 (D. Ore. 1954) (the downfall was not
due to an inadequate initial capital, but to heavy losses in receivables and the president's
speculative commitments).
97. Gleick, Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy Under the Equitable Power of
the Bankruptcy Court, 16 Bus. LAw. 619 (1961), suggests a different result when
property rather than money is contributed, citing Brown v. Freedman, 125 F.2d 151 (1st
Cir. 1942). In that case, however, the court found that the paid-in capital was not
purely nominal and the decision did not binge on whether the contribution was in the
nature of property or money.
98. See Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d 497 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 583
(1941), where advances prior to the launching of an enterprise and advances in its
first year were held permanent investments, while loans thereafter were due to
adversity not linked to insufficient capitalization.
99. 3 CoLLimR, BANKRUPTcY 1801 (14th ed. 1960).
100. In re W. J. Floyd & Co., 156-Fed. 206 (E.D.N.C. 1907). See also Wallerstein
v. Ervin, 112 Fed. 124 (3d Cir. 1901), where a claim for advances by a corporate
member of a partnership was subordinated to firm creditors.
101. 30 Stat. 547 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 23 (1958).
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like the capital contribution cases, a source of confusion for the courts and
the commentators. This is due to a failure to analyze the reasons why a
court ought to subordinate certain claims by members of a joint venture.
As a matter of theory, a claim by a participant in a joint venture should
be first subjected to the test of debt or proprietary interest (by application
of the standards described herein). If the claim is based upon a proprietary
interest, subordination to the claims of bona fide creditors follows virtually
as a matter of natural law. For a proprietary interest, whether it be a
stock interest or a partnership stake, inevitably is subsequent in time of
payment to bona flde loans.102 Therefore, once the claim has been estab-
lished as an ownership interest in reality, akin in nature to a capital con-
tribution, it is not provable under the express terms of section 63103 which
permits proof and allowance only of "debts of the bankrupt." If, however,
it appears that the claim is an out-and-out debt, then all of the conceivable
subordinating influences discussed in this article become relevant and con-
stitute a second test for the claim.
The primary test, i.e., loan or proprietary interest, should be applied in
the light of the traditional principle that a joint venture is a species of
the genus partnership.104 The question of whether an individual is a partner
in, or a creditor of, the partnership is a matter which the statutes 0 5 and
the cases have amply discussed, and no useful purpose would be served by
repeating it in this paper. The principles which have been forged to
resolve this question lie midway between the two extreme positions into
which the relatively few bankruptcy cases have fallen.
The doctrine of subordination by classification as a joint venture interest
has developed in virtual isolation in the Ninth Circuit, and there only
with respect to a narrow question of the nature of interests in an oil and
gas lease. Nonetheless, these cases reveal a dichotomy of positions which
should be resolved.
In 1932 the Ninth Circuit was faced with a situation where the bankrupt,
as lessee of real property under an oil and gas lease, "sold" "royalty inter-
ests" in a specific well, issuing therefor "assignments" which by their terms
described the relationship as one of vendor and vendee10 6 The court in
subordinating the claims held that the assignees were not creditors but
were co-adventurers, hazarding their investment upon the continued opera-
tion and success of the venture.107 This holding presumably was based
102. A proprietary interest, of whatever genre, assumes the risk of last repayment
in the event of liquidation, in return for the profit potential.
103. 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1958).
104. George W. Haxton & Son v. Rich, 267 App. Div. 492, 47 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1944)
(joint venture is a partnership of limited duration and purposes, the subject of a single
self-contained enterprise).
105. UNFoimu PAnTNEusmp AcT § 7.
106. In re Lathrap, 61 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1932).
107. Id. at 43.
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upon the facts that the assignees constantly referred to themselves as
"investors"; the assignment did not purport to transfer a part of the corpus
of the oil (the royalty being measured by the gross proceeds); under Cali-
fornia law the owner as lessee of the surface of land had no present title
to the oil in place; and the California Corporation Securities Act defined
a certificate of interest in an oil lease as a security, thereby analogizing
the interest to a preferred stock interest in a corporation. Thus, the nature
of the interest, without any consideration of the degree of participation in
management or control of the venture, was sufficient to establish a propri-
etary interest.
I This rule lasted but six years. In 1938 the Ninth Circuit was presented
-with the situation of an advance to a debtor corporation in consideration
of an offer by a stockholder of his "net profits" in the development or sale
of the oil lease.10 8 On these facts, the court could find no joint-venture, but
merely a debtor-creditor relation due to the absence of proof that the
lender had any voice in the management of the venture or that he partici-
pated in the work. 09
It would seem, however, that the true rule partakes of both stands. A
partnership or other proprietary interest may be based solely upon a
contribution of capital, without any right to or desire for a management
interest.110 On the other hand, active participation in management may
be one of a series of cumulative indicia of a proprietary interest.
C. Fraud
Fraud by a creditor in the creation or assertion of a claim will result in
disallowance or subordination of the claim."' In this connection fraud isa term of broad import." 2 There is no requirement, for example, that the
108. In re Pomoc Oil Co., 100 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1938).
109. Theriot v. Plane, 126 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1942), has also been cited for the
proposition that the mere fact that a claim arose out of a joint venture does not of
itself justify subordination where the claimant exercised no measure of control. Gleick,
Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy Under the Equitable Power of the Bankruptcy
Court, 16 Bus. LAw. 619 (1961). Despite an inappropriate reference to "joint adven-
turer" doctrine, Theriot should be read merely as stating that a loan by a stockholder-
general manager of a corporation engaged in the development of an oil and gas lease
will not be subordinated in the absence of facts showing a breach of fiduciary duty.
*But see Consolidated Royalties, Inc. v. Ashton, 132 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1942), whero
the lack of participation in the conduct or management of the business precluded a
finding of co-adventure. In effect, however, the court twisted its way to the same
result as in Lathrap, on the theory that the assignment sub judice was a transfer of a
specific percentage of the oil produced. This placed the claimants, by an alternate
route, in the position of "owners."
110. For example, an extensive body of law has flourished around the limited
partnership.
111. The reasons which may impel a court to choose to subordinate or disallow are
discussed under the heading "Subordination or Disallowance," supra.
112. 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 63.06, at 1793 (14th ed. 1960).
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factual pattern fit into the classic common law concept of fraud." 3
Furthermore, the fraudulent conduct cases are frequently interwoven
with other subordinating influences discussed in this paper.114 This, together
with the kaleidoscopic variations in fraudulent conduct, prevents refine-
ment of the cases into precise categories. It is possible, therefore, to sketch
only a few of the more repetitive patterns of fraudulent conduct which
result in subordination.
One rather large group of cases involves a fraudulent misrepresentation
of credit status. In this area certain definite principles have been formu-
lated, conforming this objection closely to the typical cause of action for
fraud and deceit. For example, where one creditor knowingly makes false
statements as to the bankrupts financial condition, that creditor's claim is
postponed only to the claims of other creditors who are shown to have been
deceived by the misrepresentation and suffered thereby. 15 The mis-
representation must be intentional or at least made with negligence so
wanton as to amount to wilfulness. 116 However, where the claimant is
also in a fiduciary relationship to the bankrupt, less will be required to
move the court to subordinate.117
The misuse of a judgment claim to the detriment of other creditors will
lead to subordination. The flagrant misuse by the dominant stockholder
in Pepper v. Litton"8 of his salary claim for the patent purpose of avoiding
payment of a valid debt of the corporation is a prime example of this mode
of misbehavior. Similarly, where a creditor, in collusion with the debtor,
uses his claim for the purpose and with the effect of defrauding other
creditors, the tainted claim will be postponed.
113. Some of the classic badges of fraud are dealt with by specific sections of the
Bankruptcy Act, i.e., § 67d and § 70e, in which total disallowance is the statutory
remedy.
114. In re Wenatchee-Stratford Orchard Co., 205 Fed. 964 (W.D. Wash. 1913)
(breach of fiduciary duty merges with fraudulent conduct on the part of the president
of a corporation). See also Carter v. Bogden, 13 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1926), which,
although dealt with on fraud lines, had elements of the undercapitalization cases.
115. L & M Realty Corp. v. Leo, 249 F.2d 688 (4th Cir. 1957), reversing 151 F.
Supp. 531 (1957) (for prior history of this case see Leo v. L & M Realty Corp., 228
F.2d 89, reversing 131 F. Supp. 557, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 969 (1956)); In re Bowman
Hardware & Elec. Co., 67 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1933); In re Star Car & Foundry Co.,
2 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1924); Wallace v. Ohio Valley Bank, 2 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1924);
Spencer v. Lowe, 198 Fed. 961, 964 (8th Cir. 1912); In re Ewald & Brainard, 135 Fed.
168 (N.D. Iowa 1905).
116. In re Madelaine, Inc., 164 F.2d 419, 420 (2d Cir. 1947) (mere financial brag-
ging did not constitute fraudulent misrepresentation); First Nat'l Bank v. Young's Estate,
41 F.2d 8, 10 (6th Cir. 1930) (no showing that gratuitous declaration of intention to
pay bankrupt's indebtedness made in bad faith); Crowder v. Allen-West Comm'n Co.,
213 Fed. 176, 184 (8th Cir. 1914) (creditor of an insolvent debtor stands in no
fiducial or contractual relationship to other creditors and he therefore owes them no
duty to inform them of the debtor's financial condition or indebtedness to him).
117. Goldie v. Cox, 130 F.2d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 1942).
118. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
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Concealment, as well as overt misrepresentation, will cause a claim to be
subordinated provided there is a duty to reveal. Consequently, where
stockholders of an insolvent corporation obtained from its creditors an
extension of time of payment on a promise to pay into the corporation a
certain sum for the continuation of the business, without giving any
intimation to the creditors that they would be secured for such advance, the
court encountered little difficulty in finding that the creditors would not
have consented to the extension had they been fully informed, and that
a blatant fraud had been perpetrated." 9
To summarize, although general principles cannot be abstracted to cover
every manifestation of fraudulent conduct, there are sufficient warning flags
to place potential claimants in bankruptcy on notice that their course of
conduct may result in the downgrading of their claims.
D. Illegality
Although illegality is a defense which might be used in any ordinary
litigation,20 it may also constitute a species of inequitable conduct which,
under certain circumstances, will invite a bankruptcy court to disallow
entirely or to subordinate a claim. Claims based on contracts or other
transactions which under applicable state law are invalid or illegal are
no more enforceable in the bankruptcy court than they would be in ordi-
nary litigation, being neither provable nor allowable.1 1
Nevertheless, it can not be said without qualification that illegality ipso
facto renders a claim void and unprovable. The illegality, whether in the
origination, acquisition, or performance of the claim, must bear more than
an incidental relation to the claim.
The foregoing principal was enunciated in the leading case of Columbia
Gas & Electric Corp. v. United States.22 There it was found that claimant
had engaged in a conspiracy to restrain and monopolize trade and com-
merce and that its claims against the debtors were acquired pursuant to
and in accomplishment of the aims and purposes of that conspiracy. Claim-
ant's basic argument, in opposition to a prayer for subordination, was that
the wrong involved (i.e., restraint of trade and monopoly) was a wrong
to the public generally, not to the creditors, and that the bankruptcy court
could not impose penalties for such conduct other than those specified in
anti-trust statutes. The court of appeals agreed that the trustee must
prove, in addition to inequitable conduct, that the debtors, their stockholders
119. Litzke v. Gregory, 1 F.2d 112 (8th Cir. 1924).
120. 3 CoWERm, Baupxurc-r 1778 (14th ed. 1960).
121. 3 CoLLIER, BKrIurrcY 1807 (14th ed. 1960). It is outside the scope of this
paper to consider the manifold examples of illegal conduct. Only a few instances of
such conduct which resulted in subordination will be discussed here.
122. 151 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1945).
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or creditors were injured thereby; 23 it held, however, that subordination to
all creditors was proper in this instance since the inevitable result of the ille-
gal conduct was to irrevocably impair the interests of creditors of every
class. Thus, it was not the illegality involved as such, but equitable consid-
erations which led to subordination. 2 4
Nevertheless, a transaction entered into in good faith and perfectly
proper in law may result in subordination merely because the intervention
of insolvency renders performance of the agreement illegal. For instance,
it is generally improper for a corporation to purchase its own shares of
stock except out of surplus. The fact that such surplus existed when the
contract of purchase was executed will not prevent subordination where
insolvency intervenes before consummation of the transaction.
125
E. Fiduciary Relationship
A large number of subordination cases involve claims asserted against a
bankrupt corporation by an officer, director, or controlling stockholder.
While not ipso facto precluded from entering into contracts with or
loaning money to his corporation,'26 an officer, director, or controlling
stockholder, long held to be a fiduciary, 2 7 must face a court of equity with
clean hands. Consequently, the bankruptcy court will regard such a transac-
tion, if not with distrust, then certainly with a large measure of watch-
ful care in order to be satisfied that the transaction was entered into in good
faith and with a view to benefit the corporation as well as other creditors
and not solely with a view to his own benefit.M As early as 1875 the Su-
preme Court pointed out that directors' dealings may be set aside on "slight
123. Id. at 467. The requirement of proof of injury proximately caused by the
inequitable conduct is a common theme in the other categories of subordinating in-
fluences.
124. In West 52nd Theatre Co. v. Tyler, 178 F.2d 128, 129 (2d Cir. 1949), the
court cited Columbia Gas, supra note 122, for the proposition that mere illegality
in the purchase of a claim does not require subordination of the claim absent the
elements of fraud upon and actual injury to the debtor. However, in Tyler, the
Second Circuit could not find those additional elements on the facts before it.
125. Robinson v. Wangemann, 75 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1935); Keith v. Kilmer, 261
Fed. 733 (1st Cir. 1919), decree amended, 265 Fed. 268, cert. denied, 252 U.S. 578
(1920). In our view, disallowance rather than subordination should result since the
illegality would be a complete defense under typical state law to an attempt to enforce
the contract.
126. Stuart v. Larson, 298 Fed. 223, 225 (8th Cir. 1924). Such persons are fre-
quently most interested in resuscitating the business and should not be bound to preside
over its demise when in a position to furnish assistance.
127. Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 492 (1919) (a dominant or con-
trolling stockholder or group of stockholders); Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S.
587 (1875) (director).
128. Richardson v. Green, 133 U.S. 30 (1890); Brown v. Freedman, 125 F.2d 151,
156 (1st Cir. 1942) (searching scrutiny); In re Burntside Lodge Inc., 7 F. Supp. 785,
787 (D. Minn. 1934) (rigid scrutiny and careful examination).
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grounds" under a doctrine founded upon "the soundest morality."' 9
However, it seems inequitable to us to impose an unbearable burden
upon fiduciaries. Such expressions as that the bona fides of their claims
must be demonstrated "beyond cavil," 30 or that a mere challenge is suffi-
cient to place the burden upon the fiduciary,131 do not seem reasonable.
The claim of the fiduciary should not be denied the same prima facie
value as any other claim and should stand, absent proof by the objectant
that there has been a breach of the fiduciary obligation. Furthermore, it
should appear that the misconduct relates to the claim either in its origin
or in its acquisition. 32 It is only at that juncture, it seems to us, that the
burden of going forward should be upon the fiduciary, and his claim sub-
jected to microscopic analysis.
The variations of the situations which may arise in connection with a
fiduciary's relationship with the corporation are infinite indeed. A fertile
area of litigation in this field relates to officers' salary claims. These are
subject to the same scrutiny as all other transactions between a fiduciary
and the corporation, and it is well settled that such claims do not differ
from claims of any nature which are rendered void or voidable because
the vote of the claimant helped to bring them into being.
133
In the case of the "one-man" or "family corporation," claims based upon
purported loans of money or property have been subordinated on the
"capital contribution" theory, or because the corporation and the stockholder
are found to be one under the alter ego theory. 34 In the succeeding sec-
tion entitled "The Instrumentality and Alter Ego Cases," we shall discuss
further the controlling equitable considerations applied by the courts
when fiduciaries are involved.
F. The Instrumentality and Alter Ego Cases
Perhaps the most unsettled area in the field of equitable subordination of
claims involves the debt due from a bankrupt corporation to its parent or
affiliated corporation, or to its controlling stockholder or stockholders. This
remains so despite a number of Supreme Court and court of appeals cases
which were thought to be decisive. The problem is not as to the validity
or extent of the claimed indebtedness, nor again as to the jurisdiction of
the court in the exercise of its broad equitable powers to subordinate the
claim of one creditor to others in the same class. The nub of the problem
129. Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587 (1875).
130. 3 CoLrr , BANKRupTcy § 63.06, at 1789 (14th ed. 1956).
131. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939).
132. In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co., 144 F.2d 791, 803 (8th Cir. 1944).
133. Goldie v. Cox, 130 F.2d 695, 717 (8th Cir. 1942); In re McCarthy Portable
Elevator Co., 201 Fed. 923 (3d Cir. 1913); In re Wenatchee-Stratford Orchard Co.,
205 Fed. 964 (W.D. Wash. 1913).
134. See discussions under the heading "Debt or Proprietary Interest," supra, and
under the heading "The Instrumentality and Alter Ego Cases," infra.
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is-what facts justify the exercise of these powers to subordinate?
To subordinate in these cases, the courts found it necessary to circum-
vent the legal concept of the separate corporate existence. They apparently
reasoned that if the parent and subsidiary were ruled to be one and the
same on the theory of principal and agent, or ownership of subsidiary by
the parent, or by treating the corporate entity as an unreality, then the
claimant stood at once as proprietor and creditor, and the general creditors
must be preferred in the distribution of the assets. 35 Thus arose the "in-
strumentality rule," said to be first declared in In re Watertown Paper Co.136
There, without citation of authorities, and by way of obiter dicta, the
Second Circuit stated that there were two exceptions to the separate cor-
porate entity rule: (1) when necessary to circumvent a fraud and (2)
where a corporation is so organized and controlled, and its affairs are so
conducted, as to make it merely an instrumentality or adjunct of another
corporation. 3 7 The language of this second exception was quoted by the
same court in Gay v. Hudson River Electric Power Co.,138 was adopted in
Hunter v. Baker Motor Vehicle Co.,13 and cited in Joseph R. Foard Co. v.
Maryland'40 and Pittsburg & Buffalo Co. v. Duncan.141
The pure instrumentality rule was short-lived.142 In Gay v. Hudson
River Electric Power Co.,143 the same judge who wrote the opinion in
Watertown Paper pointed out that the subsidiary involved was but an
adjunct of the parent, and yet decided the case on entirely other grounds.
This, said the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' 44 (which had itself fol-
lowed Watertown Paper but two years previously145 ), leads to the in-
135. See In re Kentucky Wagon Mfg. Co., 3 F. Supp. 958 (W.D. Ky. 1932), aff'd,
71 F.2d 802 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 293 U.S. 612 (1934).
136. 169 Fed. 252 (2d Cir. 1909).
137. Id. at 256.
138. 187 Fed. 12, 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1911).
139. 225 Fed. 1006, 1015 (N.D.N.Y. 1915).
140. 219 Fed. 827 (4th Cir. 1914).
141. 232 Fed. 584, 587 (6th Cir. 1916).
142. That is not to say that the memory does not linger on. For many years, until
Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939), the instrumentality rule
kept popping up. In re Kentucky Wagon Mfg. Co., 3 F. Supp. 958 (W.D. Ky. 1932),
indulging in semantics, adopted the principal and agent theory to subordinate a claim;
the court said that the test is whether one corporation controls another, and where it
does the debts due the parent-principal from the subsidiary-agent must be postponed
to the debts of other creditorsl Affirming, the circuit court said that the determinative
question is whether the relation of principal and agent existed, i.e., whether the sub-
sidiary was an instrumentality of, or an adjunct of the parent. 71 F.2d 802 (1934).
We distinguish the instrumentality cases from the alter ego cases discussed infra
under this heading, in that, in the former, the corporate form may be strictly observed,
while in the latter, to all intents and purposes, the corporate form and separate entity
are wholly ignored.
143. 187 Fed. 12 (2d Cir. 1911).
144. New York Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 250 Fed. 668 (6th Cir. 1918).
145. Pittsburgh & Buffalo Co. v. Duncan, 232 Fed. 584, 587 (6th Cir. 1916).
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ference that the Second Circuit hesitated to apply the doctrine, although
seemingly applicable, a hesitancy which makes the Gay case more valuable
because manifested by the court which first announced the doctrine. The
Sixth Circuit thereupon drowned the pure instrumentality rule in a sea of
verbiage, concluding that adjunct, as used in this connection, must be
redefined as involving the idea of "sinister purpose or wrongful results." 46
The instrumentality rule announced by the Second Circuit was unaccept-
able, said the Sixth Circuit, unless qualified to mean an agency or instru-
mentality in the sense of a means to effect a wrong, or through which a
wrong is done.
This modification of the pure instrumentality rule was supported by
respectable authority.147 The instrumentality rule at this point in its
development was transmuted into what properly may be called the "instru-
mentality plus" rule: to justify application of the instrumentality rule, there
must be present, in addition to the element of control through stock owner-
ship and common directorates and officers, elements of fraud and wrong-
doing on the part of the parent to the detriment of the subsidiary and
third persons in their relation with the subsidiary.
Referring to this instrumentality rule, the Supreme Court in the land-
mark case of Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co.148 said that it was not,
properly speaking, a rule, but a convenient way of designating the applica-
tion in particular circumstances of the broader equitable principle that the
doctrine of corporate entity, recognized generally and for most purposes,
'will not be regarded when to do so would work fraud or injustice.
Thus far we have endeavored to trace the development of the pure instru-
mentality rule, from the concept that the finding of an agency or adjunct
by itself was sufficient to pierce the corporate veil, to its modification
to "instrumentality plus" (the plus factor being "sinister purpose," "wrong-
ful results," "elements of fraud," or "wrong or injury"). Put succinctly,
domination and control plus fraud will result in disregard of the corporate
entity and call into play the equitable doctrine of subordination. This rule
offers no real problem in application, for the courts from time immemorial
have dealt with fraud and deceit, and the badges of fraud are easily recog-
nized.
But modification of the "pure instrumentality" rule did not stop with
146. The court said that it used agency, adjunct, branch, instrumentality, dummy,
buffer and tool, all to mean very much the same thing (as indeed they do). 250 Fed.
at 673.
147. Forbush Co. v. Bartley, 78 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1935); Commerce Trust Co. v.
Woodbury, 77 F.2d 478, 487 (8th Cir. 1935); Duffy v. Treide, 75 F.2d 17 (4th Cir.
1935); Finn v. George T. Mickle Lumber Co., 41 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1930); Majestic
Co. v. Orpheum Circuit, Inc., 21 F.2d 720 (8th Cir. 1927); New York Trust Co. v.
Carpenter, 250 Fed. 668 (6th Cir. 1918); Peckett v. Wood, 234 Fed. 833 (3d Cir.
1916).
148. 306 U.S. 307 (1939) (the Deep Rock case).
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the equation of domination and control plus fraud equals subordination.
Taylor said that the corporate entity would "not be regarded when to do
so would work fraud or injustice." That last word "injustice," used in the
disjunctive, is the clue to the entire "Deep Rock" doctrine developed and
announced in the Taylor decision. That decision stated a new equation to
the effect that control plus mismanagement equals subordination. It re-
opened the door through which Pepper v. Litton'49 leaped some nine
months later, coming up with its "rules of fair play" concept, which had
been announced sixty-four years earlier in Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury.50
An analysis of the lower court opinion'5 ' in Taylor is both instructive
and enlightening. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was confronted
with the following situation: a complicated, intertwined corporate, structure
with interlocking officers and directors; complete domination and manage-
ment by the parent, Standard; huge loans by it to its subsidiary, Deep Rock,
which, while undercapitalized and in dire need of cash working capital,
had to pay preferred dividends, in large amounts. The opinion discussed
the instrumentality rule in great detail, saying that it had not yet been
defined "with a degree of certainty so that it can be applied as a precise
yardstick in the admeasurement of legal rights"; the court also pointed out
that there was "respectable authority" for the proposition that to justify
the application of the rule there must be present elements of fraud or
wrongdoing. The court ended by approving a compromise which recog-
nized the parent's claim against the subsidiary. The concurring judge de-
clined to express any opinion as to whether Deep Rock was an instrumen-
tality of Standard, but agreed that the claim should be recognized since
he found no evidence of fraud from the record. The dissenting opinion
adhered to the already discredited "strict" instrumentality rule. 5 2
In reversing,153 the Supreme Court did not by any means adopt the
minority opinion in the Court below.'54 The minority judge, however, was
definitely on the right track when he said:
[S3uch transactions were not effected for the benefit of Deep Rock; that the interest
149. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
150. 91 U.S. 587 (1875).
151. 96 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1938).
152. The dissent stated that where the subsidiary is so dominated and controlled
"that it becomes the mere agency or instrumentality of the parent corporation, courts
disregard the fact that they are separate corporate beings and treat the subsidiary as
the agent or instrumentality of the parent." Id. at 708. Furthermore, "a parent cor-,
poration may not assume the position of creditor and assert a claim in bankruptcy
against its subsidiary which has been dominated and controlled as a mere adjunct,
department, or instrumentality, since the assertion of a claim in such circumstances
amounts to the presentation of a claim against itself in fraud of bona fide creditors."
Ibid.
153. 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
154. "We agree with the conclusion of the dissenting judge, but for differentrea-
sons." 306 U.S. at 314.
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of Standard was the dominant motive; that Standard was substantially enriched
through them and they constituted unjust infringement upon the rights of Deep
Rock; and that the allowance of the claim in any sum amounts to Standard
asserting a claim against itself in legal fraud of others having interest in Deep
Rock.155
The Supreme Court found that Deep Rock was precipitated into bank-
ruptcy not only because of the enormous sums it owed to Standard, but
also because of abuses in management due to the paramount interests of
interlocking officers and directors in the preservation of Standard's position.
In order to remain in undisturbed possession and to prevent the preferred
stockholders from having a vote and voice in management, 1' Standard
caused Deep Rock to pay preferred dividends in large amounts which,
whatever their legality, would not have been paid out by a company on the
precipice of bankruptcy and in dire need of cash working capital. Such
payment of dividends, said the court, was only one of the ways in which
Standard's management and control operated to the detriment of Deep
Rock's financial condition and ability to function.
The facts in Taylor paint a classic picture of domination and control
of an instrumentality or agency and if the pure instrumentality rule had had
any validity the Supreme Court could have made that rule the basis of
its decision without further ado. What made its ruling a "doctrine" dis-
tinguishable from the so-called instrumentality rule was the "plus" factor.
The Court later said in Pepper v. Litton'57 that the subordination in
Taylor was based on the equities of the case-the history of spoilation, mis-
management and faithless stewardship of the affairs of the subsidiary by
Standard to the detriment of the public investors. Again, eight years later
in Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors,158 the Court said that in
Taylor it had reformulated for application to reorganization cases a whole-
some equity doctrine that a claim by a parent against a subsidiary should be
at least subordinated when the parent wholly dominates and controls the
subsidiary and in the transactions creating the debt breaches its fiduciarj
duty and acts both to its own benefit and to the detriment of the debtor.
Comstock in effect delivered the coup de grace to the instrumentality
rule when it said that it is not the mere existence of an opportunity to do
wrong that brings the rule into play; it is the unconscionable use by
the parent of the opportunity afforded by the domination to advantage itself
to the injury- of the subsidiary that deprives the wrongdoer of the fruits of
his wrong.
155. 96 F.2d at 710. (Emphasis added.)
156. The charter of Deep Rock conferred voting power on preferred stockholders
only in case the company should be in default of dividends on the preferred stock for
a period of more than six months. 306 U.S. at 320 n.1.
157. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
158. 335 U.S. 211 (1948).
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Taylor, in enunciating the Deep Rock doctrine, dispelled the uncertainty
surrounding the application of the instrumentality rule. In order to justify
disregard of the fiction of separate corporate entity-to pierce the cor-
porate veil-there must appear more than domination and control. So much
is now clearly established law. In Taylor the "plus factor" was a history of
spoilation, mismanagement and faithless stewardship, which clearly tainted
the transactions with fraud. But Taylor also said, without further elucida-
tion, that the necessary additional factor could be "injustice" and therein
lies the rub, for this enters the realm of the higher abstractions. It was into
this world of abstractions that Pepper vaulted. Dealing with as blatant and
glaring a fraudulent attempt to cheat a creditor as is conceivable, Pepper
could have disposed of the case on its fraud aspect alone. Nevertheless,
it proceeded to discuss at some length the violation of moral obligations
which should move the court to exercise its equitable powers. Conse-
quently the decision is a parade of the highly abstract terms "equities of
the case," "unfairness," "arms-length bargain," "fair play," "good conscience"
and "unconscionable," all of which, by dictionary definition, are synonymous
with "justice" and "injustice." It is, of course, impossible to extract from
Pepper a basic rule or set of rules which can be followed with any con-
sistency or uniformity. Who, for example, can recite the "rules of fair
play" referred to by Justice Douglas? In dealing with these abstractions,
what may be "fair play" to one judge is "unconscionable" to another. Thus,
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy in the Comstock case, con-
curred in by Justices Black, Douglas and Rutledge, disagreed not so much
with the principles expressed by the majority, but with the interpretation
to be placed upon the facts disclosed: the majority saw no violation of the
rules of fair play; the minority did.
The plain truth is that Pepper said not too little, but too much. It is
impossible to criticize anything said by Justice Douglas; everything he
expressed is in accord with the cardinal principles of equity jurisprudence.
But it seems to us that the opinion should have been content with restating
the broad principles enunciated in Taylor, leaving it to the lower courts to
apply them to the facts peculiar to each case. It is utterly impossible to
delineate, as Pepper sought to do, the multitudinous combination of facts
which are only limited by the ingenuity of man bent on self-aggrandizement
at the expense of another.
Were all the rules of Pepper reduced to one general formula, it could be
stated as follows: officers or directors or a controlling stockholder or group
of stockholders are fiduciaries whose dealings with the company are subject
to rigorous scrutiny; in passing upon their claims the bankruptcy court,
sitting as a court of equity, will sift the circumstances of their transactions
with the corporation to see whether they are inherently fair and carry the
earmarks of an arm's length bargain; where they do not, they will be dis-
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allowed, or at least subordinated. 59
The third of the "big three" Supreme Court decisions in this area, Com-
stock v. Group of Institutional Investors,16 not only modifies the Pepper
case, but also clearly illustrates how nebulous are the border lines drawn
by the abstractions in Pepper. In Comstock, the majority said that the
parent so dominated the subsidiary that under the rule of the Taylor case
it could not enrich itself by breach of its trust, if any such breach were
found to exist. The case hinged largely on contemporary advances by
parent to subsidiary for capital improvements and the payment of dividends
which for the most part went to the parent. The court below16' made ex-
plicit findings that the effect of control was beneficial and advantageous to
the subsidiary and that all dividends were paid either out of earned surplus
or out of net income after payment of all prior charges against income. The
majority opinion in the Supreme Court held that while contemporaneous
borrowing and payment of dividends is not in itself illegal, it would come
under the ban of the Taylor decision if carried out in breach of good faith
to the advantage of the parent and to the detriment of the subsidiary. In
view of the findings of good faith, fair dealing and freedom from fraud or
overreaching, allowance of the claim was held not to be an error of law.
The minority'm wrote that the equities which form the Deep Rock doc-
trine relate not only to matters of bad faith, but are also concerned with
the essential fairness and propriety of transactions from an objective point
of view (citing Pepper). Inequity, they said, may be present where there
is the utmost good faith. Since Justice Douglas, who concurred in this
dissent, wrote the opinion in Pepper, we can assume that he intended
there to exclude good faith in the test of fairness and impropriety. If that
be so, then Comstock must be considered to modify Pepper to that extent.
It is interesting to note that while five Justices found that the claim of
the parent was the outgrowth of complicated but legitimate good faith
business transactions, neither in design nor effect producing injury to the
subsidiary's investors, four justices disagreed, finding a breach of fiduciary
obligations and mismanagement clearly within the ban of the Deep Rock
doctrine. This difference of opinion again demonstrates that in dealing
with abstractions the result will be as varied as the outlook of the judges
who must apply them to a given set of facts.
The wide-spread disagreement in this sphere is illustrated by a trio of
cases in the Second Circuit. In re V. Loewer's Gambrinus Brewery Co.
16 3
was decided in March 1948, three months before Comstock was banded
down. Judge Frank, citing Taylor and Pepper, said that the test does not
159. Goldie v. Cox, 130 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1942).
160. 335 U.S. 211 (1948).
161. 163 F.2d 350 (8th Cir. 1947).
162. 335 U.S. at 231 (Justices Murphy, Black, Douglas and Rutledge).
163. 167 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1948).
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turn upon the existence of an instrumentality, but whether failure to subor-
dinate will "work injustice," will not "be fair and equitable to other credi-
tors," will result "in violation of rules of fair play and good conscience."
He then turned about and proceeded to decide the case on the basis of
the "pure instrumentality" rule, holding that the potential injustice to
creditors was so great as to require subordination. For, he said, "in such
circumstances, unfairness can easily occur and yet be so easily concealed
that no scrutiny by the bankruptcy court, however rigid, could correct it."
"As a matter of public policy," wrote Judge Frank, "the stockholders will
not be heard to deny unfairness." This astonishing proposition was flatly
contradicted four months later by Comstock which said: "It is not the
mere existence of an opportunity to do wrong which brings the [Deep
Rock] rule into play; it is the unconscionable use of the opportunity af-
forded by the domination to advantage itself at the injury of the subsidiary
that deprives the wrongdoer of the fruits of his wrong."164
In Gambrinus, Judge Learned Hand, concurring 165 with Judge Frank,
likewise conceded that the Deep Rock rule had repudiated "adjunct,"
"agency," or "instrumentality" as a test. He then proceeded to expound his
own views as to why it is unfair to permit the controlling parent-creditor
to share in any case in the assets with the insolvent subsidiary's creditors.
The third judge, Judge Swan, merely concurred in the result.
Several years after Gambrinus, in Schwartz v. Mills, 6 Judge Clark wrote
that Gambrinus was "not stated as an absolute rule of law, to be applied
notwithstanding the injustice it might cause."167 Subordination, he said,
did not follow automatically upon the showing of identity between officers
and stockholders of parent and subsidiary. "We have traditionally stressed
the elements of fraud and actual injury to the debtor interests .... Peti-
tioner here has given no hint even of fraudulent conveyance, manufactured
claim or mismanagement .... ." But Judge Frank, the decision in Comstock
to the contrary notwithstanding, dissented and held to his original views
expressed in Gambrinus; that is, where there was identity of stockholders,
then, without proof of any kind of fraud or unfairness whtasoever, the
claim of the creditor corporation had to be subordinated to those of all
other creditors. 168
In 1955, Judge Frank finally conceded that in view of Comstock, the
164. 335 U.S. at 229.
165. 167 F.2d at 319.
166. 192 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1951).
167. Id. at 729. With this decision, Gambrinus began to totter. The repudiation
was made complete in Gannet Co. v. Larry, 221 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1955), and in
1957 Judge Hand bowed to Comstock, saying: "Whatever the effect of previous deci-
sions . . . [Comstock] declared that some abuse of the stockholder's control* must
appear before his debt loses its parity." Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 411
(2d Cir. 1957) (dissenting opinion).
168. 192 F.2d at 731.
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strict rule of Gambrinus could not stand; in subordinating the parent's
claim he applied the Deep Rock doctrine as modified by Pepper and ex-
pounded in Comstock. In Gannet Co. v. Larry,69 the parent Gannet was
in the publishing business. Fearing that the war situation would result in a
newsprint shortage, it acquired the stock of the bankrupt, a paper manu-
facturer, to whom it made large advances for the purpose, among other
things, of converting the bankrupfs plant machinery to the production of
newsprint. Fears of a shortage proved unfounded, and the subsidiary, now
producing newsprint, operated at a loss which led to bankruptcy. There
was no proof of fraud or illegality, nor was it claimed that the parent acted
in bad faith. The parent's claim was subordinated because the losses of the
subsidiary were suffered in the attempt to turn it into a source of news-
print, of no interest to other creditors unless financially profitable, but of
distinct interest to the parent, whether or not financially profitable, because
of the possible newsprint shortage. It was therefore held to be "unfair" to
allow the parent's claim on a parity with other creditors notwithstanding
the absence of fraud or illegality.
Gannets claim that the mistakes in management were business errors
made in good faith were brushed aside. It is safe to assume that if Gannet
were in a completely unrelated line of business and had launched its sub-
sidiary on a new venture solely to improve the subsidiary's financial condi-
tion (and, of course, to reap the profits as sole stockholder), it would not
have suffered subordination of its claim when the experiment ended in
disaster.
Gannet did not establish a new doctrine. In 1890 the Supreme Court
said in Richardson v. Green70 that courts of equity would regard with a
"large measure of watchful care" all transactions by officers, directors and
stockholders with their corporation and "unless satisfied by the proof that
the transaction was entered into in good faith, with a view to the benefit of
the company as well as its creditors, and not solely with a 'View to his own
benefit, they [courts of equity] refuse to lend their aid to its enforcement."
The italicized words have an almost uncanny applicability to the facts in
Gannet.
Gannet was followed by the Fourth Circuit in International Tel. & Tel.
Corp. v. Holton,i" i where it was held that when a subsidiary is controlled
by the parent for its own purposes, and without regard to the interest of
the subsidiary, the claim of the parent should be subordinated and this with-
out proof of fraud or illegality. This is a fair enough statement of the rule
in Gannet. But, for reasons we cannot fathom, the Fourth Circuit cited
with approval New York Trust Co. v. Island Oil & Transport Corp.,172
169. 221 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1955).
170. 133 U.S. 30, 43 (1890). (Emphasis added.)
171. 247 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1957).
172. 56 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1932).
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which stands for the pure instrumentality rule; on the other hand, the court
ignored the Taylor case, decided a year earlier, which repudiated the pure
instrumentality rule. Compounding this serious oversight, the same court
also cited with approval the Gambrinus and Watertown Paper cases despite
their repudiation by the court of their origin.
We think that Gannet has reached the outermost periphery of the prin-
ciples announced in Taylor-Pepper-Comstock. Gannet presented nothing
more than an honest mistake in judgment-the fear of a newsprint shortage
was common to all involved in its use at that time. The mistake, however,
was made in an effort not to improve the financial condition of the subsidi-
ary, but to protect itself when, as and if the shortage occurred. Were the
courts to go one step beyond the Gannet principle, the circle would be
completed and we would be back to the pure instrumentality rule.
Before leaving this area, we should like to note that there may be some
doubt as to whether the rules enumerated in the Taylor, Pepper, Comstock
and Gannet cases (and the myriad others following, interpreting and ex-
plaining these decisions) have any bearing on the alter ego concept. Where
the relationship goes beyond the instrumentality, adjunct, department, or
principal and agent situation-where the corporation is so completely assimi-
lated that it is truly the alter ego of the parent or of the dominant stock-
holder (as is frequently the case in the "one man" or "family corporation")-
will the corporation be treated as if it had no existence? Will the cor-
porate entity be disregarded without a "plus" factor? Pepper said that
disallowance or subordination is a result reached where on the facts "the
bankrupt has been used merely as a corporate pocket of the dominant
stockholder, who, with disregard of the substance or form of corporate
management, has treated its affairs as his own."173 We think that the tenor
of the cases we have discussed is to abrogate the rule of the earlier cases
dealing with alter ego situations; the modem tendency is to respect the
corporate entity unless the notion of legal entity is used to justify wrong,
protect fraud, or defend crime,174 or unless there is a "violation of
the rules of fair play and good conscience by the claimant." Pepper
said that one cannot use the corporate device to avail himself of privi-
leges normally permitted outsiders in a race of creditors; cannot use
his inside information for his own preferment; cannot do indirectly through
the corporation what he could not do directly. The effect of Pepper clearly
is to require in the alter ego cases some abuse or breach of the rules of
fair play constituting a wrong which equity will remedy.
. When, however, the parties themselves choose to ignore the corporate
entity to the extent that it has no separate existence,17 then the courts well
173. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 309 (1939).
174. In the Matter of Gibraltor Amusements, Ltd., 291 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1961),
affirming 187 F. Supp. 931 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
175. For example, where a single bank account is maintained, no corporate books
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may, as the parties by their own conduct have already elected to do, dis-
regard a pseudo-corporate entity.17 6 In such a case. the "plus factor is
easily discernible: having treated the corporation as its own enterprise, the
dominant stockholder violates the rules of fair play and good conscience in
attempting to assume the dual role of proprietor and creditor, whichever at
the moment suits his purpose.
To recapitulate: mere control or domination of a corporation is not
proscribed by law and is in itself insufficient to justify piercing the corporate
veil and subordinating claims. The fiction of a separate legal entity will
be respected unless to the elements of domination and control are added
certain factors which will motivate the bankruptcy court, sitting as a court
of equity, to disregard the fiction. These "plus" factors may be fraud,
plain and simple, or a history of spoilation, mismanagement and faithless
stewardship which is tantamount to fraud; they may be simply the violation
of rules of fair play and good conscience which amounts to a breach of
the fiduciary standards of conduct owed to the corporation, a use of the
powers of an "insider" for personal advantage to the detriment of creditors
-all of which constitutes a "wrong" which equity will undo or intervene to
prevent.
There is nothing inherently wrong about a parent corporation or con-
trolling stockholder, officer, or director becoming a creditor of the corpora-
tion, either through loans or advancements of the character of loans; all
such transactions, however, will be subject to rigid scrutiny and claims
arising therefrom will be enforced only where good faith and fairness is
found, only if the transactions carry the earmarks of an arm's length bar-
gain, and only when fraud or overreaching are wanting.
In examining the transaction, a basic question is whether it was for the
benefit of the corporation or whether it was essentially for the benefit of
the controlling parent corporation, or the controlling stockholder or stock-
holders, officers and directors. If the former, the claim will be allowed to
share pari passu with other creditors; if the latter, it will be subordinated
to the claims of the other creditors.
are kept, no board meetings are held, the hiring and firing of employees and con-
tractual relations are dictated by the parent or controlling stockholder or stockholders.
176. Centmont Corp. v. Marsch, 68 F.2d 460 (1st Cir. 1933) (subsidiary organized
to accomplish a specific object of the parent and the separate corporate entity largely
ignored); Page v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 53 F.2d 27 (8th Cir. 1931) (assets of
two syndicates intermingled, accounts confused, corporate affairs completely scrambled.
and situation indicated implied merger); Edward Finch Co. v. Robie, 12 F.2d 360 (8th
Cir. 1926) (sole stockholder disregarded corporate entity in every respect); fi re
Muncie Pulp Co., 130 Fed. 546 (2d Cir. 1905) (subsidiary held to be a creature of




It seems to us that there has been much unwarranted confusion in
connection with the subordination of claims in bankruptcy. The equitable
powers of the bankruptcy court in dealing with claims have not been seri-
ously challenged; certainly not in recent years. In subordinating ethically
inferior claims, no new fundamental principles have evolved, nor have
they been necessary in order to cope with the problem. All that was re-
quired was the extension of cardinal principles of equitable jurisprudence,
long employed to thwart fraud and inequity, into a new field.
Analysis of the decisions relating to subordination disclose a number of
reasons for the confused state of affairs in this area. Primarily, there has
been an abundance of dicta177 which succeeding cases, without much
thought, have relied upon and transformed into a body of case law. There
also have been a number of cases which have relied upon decisions al-
ready repudiated by the courts of their origin; these same cases have
ignored Supreme Court decisions directly in point.
The psychological factor has compounded the confusion: some judges
have found it difficult to follow Supreme Court decisions which conflicted
with their own strong personal convictions. Judge Frank's reluctance to
retreat from his decision in the Gambrinus case and Judge Learned Hand's
concurring opinion in that case are illustrative. Finally, as we have
pointed out (and it bears repetition), in dealing with the abstract terms
"justice," "fair play," and "good conscience," the outcome has often de-
pended upon the particular bench-again a matter of the personal philoso-
phy of the judge. This surely must explain the many opinions by divided
courts in this field.
Perhaps, because of the psychological factors involved, and because the
cases are decided by judges of widely divergent personal views in an
area where there is room for honest difference of opinion in interpreting
the facts, a certain amount of conflict is inevitable. Nevertheless, as a
result of the Taylor, Pepper, Comstock and other leading cases, the direc-
tion is clear. The basic and overriding consideration of equity is the
prevention of fraud and injustice when the remedy at law is inadequate.
Where the facts indicate that allowance of a claim on equal terms with
others would constitute an injustice, subordination is the remedy afforded
by equity, And, where man's ingenuity creates new situations without pre-
cise factual precedent, equity has the capacity to adapt itself. In so doing,
equity will be found equal to the task, extending old principles, if neces-
sary, to accomplish its purpose.
177. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), so often cited, is a prime example.
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